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Abstract
Welfare ranking of policy instruments is addressed in a two-sector
Ramsey model with monopoly pricing in one sector as the only dis-
tortion. When government spending is restricted, i.e. when a gov-
ernment is unable or unwilling to finance the required costs for imple-
menting the optimum policy, subsidies that directly aﬀect investment
incentives may generate higher welfare eﬀects than the direct instru-
ment, which is a production subsidy. The driving mechanism is that
an investment subsidy may be more cost eﬀective than the direct in-
strument; and that the relative welfare gain from cost eﬀectiveness can
exceed the welfare loss from introducing new distortions. Moreover,
it is found that the investment subsidy is gradually phased out of the
welfare maximizing policy, which may be a policy combining the two
subsidies, when the level of government spending is increased.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the choice of policy instruments under restricted govern-
ment spending, which arises when a government is unable or unwilling to
use the level of spending required to implement the optimum policy. This
implies that the government has to choose between alternative instruments
using a predetermined and constant level of financial resources for correct-
ing imperfections. In particular, the welfare ranking of alternative subsidies
that all burden the government budget is studied. The main finding is that
direct policy instruments may not generate the largest welfare eﬀect. In-
stead, indirect instruments targeted on investment incentives may have more
significant welfare eﬀects. The explanation is that such instruments may
be relatively cost eﬀective. Even though new distortions are introduced,
the negative welfare eﬀect from these may be surpassed by positive welfare
eﬀects from cost eﬀectiveness by such a magnitude that the net-welfare eﬀect
exceeds that of the direct instrument.
The standard principle for economic policy developed by Bhagwati and
Ramaswami (1963) and Bhagwati (1971) suggests that instruments targeted
directly on a distortion should be applied when government spending is unre-
stricted, because policy responses that correct distortions indirectly introduce
new distortions. The policy that eliminates the distortion completely is the
optimum policy and this policy will raise national welfare to the greatest
extent possible. This paper suggests that direct instruments should not nec-
essary be applied under restricted government spending since they may not
lead to the largest welfare eﬀect.1
The common framework applied in the literature on distortions and wel-
fare is within the group of static, small open economy models. Consequently,
indirect instruments in the form of tariﬀs, export subsidies, quotas etc. are
introduced when the static model for the closed economy is extended to the
open economy framework. In this paper, the static model for the closed
economy is extended in a diﬀerent dimension by using a dynamic model with
physical capital accumulation. The distortion under investigation is still
1The standard principle is a well-established result in economics and is taught in many
undergraduate as well as graduate courses. This is illustrated clearly by one of the most in-
fluential textbook of International Economics by Krugman and Obstfeld (2002, p.227-228):
"It is always preferable to deal with a market failure as directly as possible, because indirect
policy responses lead to unintended distortions of incentives elsewhere in the economy".
Another formulation of the principle by Krugman (1996), is "the appropriate policy is
always a surgical strike on the source of the distortion."
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static, implying that another group of indirect instruments is introduced.
These are instruments aﬀecting investment incentives, which can be used to
reduce the eﬀects of the distortion indirectly.
The focal point of the paper is economic policy under restricted govern-
ment spending. Consequently, mechanisms causing restricted government
spending are not modeled formally and are not expected to change the main
result if included. However, one can think of a number causing mechanisms.
Restricted government spending may be a consequence of marginal costs of
public funds above one, which may be due to distortional income taxes or
distributional considerations, see for example Neary (1994). Alternatively,
the government may not want to tax voters too heavily because they punish
public expenditure, see for example Peltzman (1992). Finally, the econ-
omy may be a developing country that has only restricted access to financial
resources including development aid, see for example Burnside and Dollar
(2000) that report average levels of development aid as a percent of GDP
equal to 2.1 in a group of low-income countries.
The analysis is related to the literature on marginal cost of public funds,
where alternative taxes for financing the same amount of government spend-
ing are compared under the diﬀerential analysis, see for example Ballard
(1990) and Håkonsen (1998). This type of analysis investigates the eﬃ-
ciency eﬀects of financing public expenditures, while the eﬀects of govern-
ment spending are of no concern. In this paper, the eﬃciency eﬀects of
government spending is investigated, while the eﬀects of public finance are
of no concern.
The applied model is a simple two-sector Ramsey model of a closed econ-
omy with a representative household that supply labor services inelastically.
Intermediate goods produced in a separate sector are employed as input in
a final goods sector. The market form is monopoly in the intermediate sec-
tor, whereas perfect competition prevails in the final goods sector. Hence,
the only distortion is monopoly pricing. This distortion implies that inter-
mediate demand is below the social optimum. An indirect consequence of
low demand is that the incentive to invest in physical capital is below the
social optimum. This is an important relationship since monopoly pricing,
which directly generates static ineﬃciency in the sector, indirectly aﬀects the
incentive to invest and thereby generates dynamic ineﬃciency.
To investigate whether investment subsidies can generate higher welfare
gains than the direct instrument under restricted government spending, the
welfare ranking of production and investment subsidies is studied for given
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levels of government spending. A production subsidy is a direct policy in-
strument to correct for monopoly pricing. This subsidy aﬀects the static
distortion directly and has an indirect impact on the incentive to invest.
Thereby, a larger share of primary production factors are allocated to the in-
termediate sector and moreover the stock of physical capital increases. Using
this instrument the government can correct completely for the monopoly dis-
tortion and make firms price according to marginal costs, provided that the
optimum policy is implemented.
As a consequence of the dynamic nature of the model, a subsidy to in-
vestments in physical capital is also a relevant policy instrument. This
subsidy, however, is an indirect instrument that distort the market for capi-
tal. Hence, the government introduces a new distortion in another market as
a side eﬀect when attempting to remedy the distorting eﬀect from the orig-
inal imperfection. The investment subsidy has opposite eﬀects on welfare.
On the one hand, the government distorts the market for physical capital by
increasing the incentive to invest; on the other hand, this indirectly increases
intermediate production. The subsidy reduces user costs relative to wages,
implying that the capital labor ratios increase in both sectors. Therefore,
this instrument leads to a higher capital stock but does not correct for the
ineﬃcient allocation of primary production factors across sectors.
In the remainder of the paper, the formal analysis is presented. Section
2 presents the model. Section 3 presents the main result that the investment
subsidy may generate larger welfare eﬀects than the production subsidy. Sec-
tion 4 discusses the results and concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Final Goods
Final goods are produced according to the constant returns to scale produc-
tion function:
Y = AXαKβYL
1−α−β
Y , 0 < α, β, α+ β < 1. (1)
Y is the quantity of final goods, X is input of intermediate goods, LY is labor
input, and KY is the input of physical capital.
Given the assumptions of perfect competition and profit-maximizing firms,
the demand for intermediate goods, capital and labor equal:
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X = (Aα/pX)
1/(1−α)Kβ/(1−α)Y L
(1−α−β)/(1−α)
Y (2)
KY = (Aβ/rK)
1/(1−β)Xα/(1−β)L(1−α−β)/(1−β)Y (3)
LY = (A (1− α− β) /w)1/(α+β)Xα/(α+β)Kβ/(α+β)Y , (4)
where pX is the price of intermediate goods, w is the wage rate, and rK is
user costs of capital. rK = r + δ, where r is the rate of return to capital
and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. The price of final goods is used as
numeraire, i.e. pY = 1.
2.2 Intermediate Goods
Intermediate goods are produced using the production technology repre-
sented by
X = GKξXL
1−ξ
X , (5)
where KX and LX are inputs of physical capital and labor. There is market
power in the sector and intermediate goods are supplied by a monopolist.
The producer of intermediate goods minimizes costs implying that the
cost function equals ucX with unit costs uc = rξKw
1−ξ assumingG = ξ−ξ (1− ξ)−(1−ξ).
The demand for capital and labor, respectively, equal
KX =
ξucX
rK
= ξ
µ
w
rK
¶1−ξ
X (6)
LX =
(1− ξ)ucX
w
= (1− ξ)
³rK
w
´ξ
X (7)
The monopolist maximizes profits
πX = (pX − uc)X, (8)
subject to the demand function (2). The price of intermediate goods is
accordingly determined by pX = uc/α, which implies the market clearing
quantity for intermediate goods
X = Aα2/(1−α)uc−1/(1−α)Kβ/(1−α)Y L
(1−α−β)/(1−α)
Y .
The consequence of the only distortion is that the price of intermediate goods
is determined as a constant mark-up over user costs. In the social optimum
the intermediate price equals marginal costs.
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2.3 Household Sector
The household sector is characterized by a representative household with
an infinite time horizon. Intertemporal preferences are described by the
isoelastic utility integral:
U =
Z ∞
0
e−ρt
C1−θ − 1
1− θ dt. (9)
where ρ > 0 is the rate of time preference, θ > 0 is the inverse intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, and C is consumption of final goods. Utility is
maximized subject to the dynamic budget constraint:
F˙ = wL+ rF − C, (10)
where F is aggregate financial capital. The usual No Ponzi Game condition
applies, i.e. private debt cannot increase asymptotically faster than the rate
of return.
The growth rate of consumption is derived from the first-order conditions
with respect to consumption, C, and financial assets, F , and equals
gC = (r − ρ) /θ (11)
where gC indicates the growth rate of C.
2.4 Market Clearing
The equilibrium condition for the intermediate goods market is already im-
posed. Moreover, the labor market and the physical capital market have to
clear. The solution for the production side of the economy is presented in
Appendix A. The market clearing condition for the final goods market is
derived to
K˙ = α2αK 0εL01−ε − C − δK (12)
where K 0, L0 and ε that equal
K 0 = K/
¡
β + α2ξ
¢
L0 = L/
¡
(1− α− β) + α2 (1− ξ)
¢
ε = αξ + β
are used to compress the notation. See Appendix B for the derivation of
(12). Finally, the market for shares in the intermediate firm clears according
to Walras’ Law.
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2.5 Policy Instruments and Government Spending
Monopoly power generates a distortion in pricing of intermediate goods,
which calls for welfare improving policy interventions. The impact on the
economy of the distortion can be seen by comparing the shares of primary
production factors employed in the two sectors and the steady state capital
stocks of the marked economy and the command optimum, see Appendix
D. Variables are denoted by superscript M in the marked economy and
C in the command optimum. It is found that KMY /K
M
X > K
C
Y /K
C
X and
LMY /L
M
X > L
C
Y /L
C
X , implying that the shares of capital and labor allocated
to the final goods sector are too high in the market solution compared to
those of the command optimum. As a consequence, the production of inter-
mediate goods in the market equilibrium is too low. This follows directly
from monopoly pricing: The monopoly distortion moves the economy away
from the optimal outcome of marginal cost pricing. Since the price is de-
termined as a constant mark-up over marginal costs, demand is below the
social optimum, which reduces the demand for production factors in the sec-
tor. Moreover, as an indirect eﬀect of monopoly pricing it can be shown
that the steady state capital stock in the market solution is lower than in
social optimum, i.e. KM
∗
< KC
∗
.
In the following, I compare welfare eﬀects of alternative policy instru-
ments. Especially, I focus on the case of restricted government spending.
Hence, for some reason the government is unable or unwilling to finance the
policies above a certain exogenously given level. Two policy instruments
are investigated: (1) a subsidy to intermediate production (the direct in-
strument)2 and (2) a subsidy to investment in physical capital that as an
additional eﬀect to increasing intermediate production distorts the market
for physical capital (an indirect instrument). In the following, the two sub-
sidies are referred to as the production subsidy and the investment subsidy,
respectively.
The production subsidy covers a share of production costs. For a given
2The direct instrument can either be a subsidy to intermediate purchase or a subsidy
to intermediate production. The subsidy to intermediate purchase reduces the price
of intermediate goods by covering a share of purchasing costs, whereas the subsidy to
intermediate production covers a share of production costs. In the following, I do not
analyze the subsidy to intermediate purchase because it is less cost eﬀective to implement
than the production subsidy and leads to identical eﬀects on the economy. Hence, the
welfare consequences of the subsidy to intermediate purchase is always below those of the
subsidy to intermediate production for a given level of government spending.
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subsidy level, the direct instrument lead to an intermediate price of:
p¯ = (1− SX)uc/α (13)
where SX denotes the subsidy level. The direct eﬀect of this instrument is an
increase in the demand for intermediate goods, which is a direct static eﬀect.
Moreover, the larger demand for intermediate goods increases the demand
for physical capital and thereby the incentive to invest. This implies that
the direct instrument also generates an indirect dynamic eﬀect.
The optimum policy is a subsidy level of the direct instrument equal to
SX = (1− α). For this level, the distortion from monopoly pricing is fully
eliminated and the purchasing price for intermediates equals the marginal
costs of production. Consequently, the allocation of primary production
factors between sectors resamples those of the command optimum and the
steady state capital stock increases to the optimal level. The government is
thus able to simulate the economic outcome a social planner who maximizes
the utility of his representative household would choose.
The investment subsidy covers a cost share, SK , of investment in physical
capital and reduces the price of investment from 1 to (1− SK). As a conse-
quence, the user cost of physical capital changes to the standard expression
as developed by Jorgenson (1963):
rK = (1− SK) (r + δ)−
•
(1− SK)
which aﬀects unit costs of production. This subsidy is targeted on the
incentive to invest in physical capital and therefore leads to a direct dynamic
eﬀect. When the subsidy is implemented, the general level of user costs are
reduced implying a reduction in production costs for both sectors. Therefore,
the instrument does not aﬀect the allocation of capital and labor across
sectors. It is clear that this subsidy is an indirect instrument, since it does
not aﬀect the distortion from monopoly pricing directly but instead distorts
the capital market.
The investment subsidy has opposite eﬀects on welfare. On the one
hand, the government distorts the market for physical capital by increasing
the overall incentive to invest. Hence, an investment subsidy does not cor-
rect for the misallocation of resources across sectors. On the other hand,
the subsidy indirectly increases intermediate production through accumula-
tion of physical capital. Consequently, the policy maker cannot imitate the
command optimum using this instrument.
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Government spending under the two subsidies equal
BX = SXucX = SX
α2(1+α)L01−εK 0ε
(1− SX)α
when intermediate production is subsidized and
BK = SK
³
K˙ + δK
´
when investments are subsidized. In the following, the analysis is per-
formed under the assumption of a balanced government budget. The level
of financial resources, B, used to correct the imperfection of the economy
is predetermined, implying that the two subsidy levels are determined by
B = BX = BK. It is common to analyze economic policy for unrestricted
government spending. Hence, the government implements the subsidy level,
and the required costs are determined accordingly. The approach taken in
this analysis is opposite in the sense that the spending level is exogenous,
implying that the subsidy rate is determined accordingly.
3 Welfare Analysis
3.1 Specific Factors Model
It is not possible to study the total welfare eﬀect including the transitional
dynamics between steady state equilibria analytically in the general version
of the model. However, the version of the model with physical capital as
specific production factor to intermediate production and labor as specific
production factor to final goods production, i.e. ξ = 1 and β = 0, can be
studied analytically. This version of the model is interesting in relation to
subsidy levels because the two instruments have diﬀerent implications for the
required level of government spending. Hence, it has important implications
for the costs required for implementing the two subsidies. It turns out that
the investment subsidy is always more cost eﬀective than the production
subsidy. The specific factor version of the model is not interesting, however,
in relation to comparing instruments by itself, because the investment subsidy
essentially is equivalent to the production subsidy. As a consequence, it is
not possible to distinguish the two instruments in the reduced form of the
model. In other words, in terms of economic eﬀects it does not matter
whether the government uses an investment subsidy or a production subsidy
of similar level.
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Steady state consumption under the investment subsidy, i.e. SK > 0
and SX = 0, in relation to steady state consumption under the production
subsidy, i.e. SK = 0 and SX > 0, equals:
C∗K
C∗X
=
µ
1− SX
1− SK
¶ 1
1−α (δ + ρ) (1− SK)− δ
(δ + ρ) (1− SX)− δ
where subscripts denote the applied policy instrument. ∗ denotes the steady
state value of a variable. The relative government spending required to
implement the two subsidies equals:
B∗K
B∗X
=
SK
SX
µ
1− SX
1− SK
¶ 1
1−α δ
δ + ρ
.
It is easily seen that C∗K/C
∗
X = 1 and B
∗
K/B
∗
X = δ/ (δ + ρ) < 1 for SK = SX .
To ensure government spending of similar magnitudes under the two instru-
ments, i.e. B∗K/B
∗
X = 1, SK has to increase and/or SX has to decrease, which
implies that C∗K/C
∗
X > 1. Consequently, steady state consumption under
the investment subsidy increases by more than steady state consumption un-
der the production subsidy, leading to higher steady state welfare for the
investment subsidy as long as the policy does not over-subsidize the activity.
In this version of the model, the investment subsidy generates no distor-
tions in the sense that the shares of primary production factors employed in
final goods production are too high. Since the investment subsidy does not
distort the economy, we cannot distinguish between the economic eﬀects of
the two subsidies. In this sense, it is not important whether the govern-
ment uses one instrument or the other. What is important, however, is that
the government should use the investment subsidy because it is more cost
eﬀective. If the government can correct fully for the monopoly distortion
it should use an investment subsidy of SK = 1 − α, which generates the
optimum level of the physical capital stock.
It is not only in steady state equilibrium that the investment subsidy
results in relatively low levels of government spending. The result holds
when the transitional dynamics is taken into account because the solution of
the model is the same under the two policy instruments, see Appendix C.1.
Government spending, on the other hand, equals:
BX =
SXα1+2αL01−εK 0ε
(1− SX)α
= SXK (r + δ)
BK = SKK (gK + δ)
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under the two subsidies. It is seen that BX and BK depend on the same
variables except for BK depending on the growth rate of capital and BX
depending on the rate of return. Since the rate of return always exceeds the
growth rate, which is easily verified by gK = r− (C +B) / ((1− SK)K) < r,
BX > BK for SX = SK always hold. Hence, for given subsidy levels the
level of government spending under the production subsidy always exceeds
that of the investment subsidy, implying that the investment subsidy is the
first-best instrument for all levels of government spending.
3.2 Simulations of the Model
3.2.1 Specific Factor Model
Figure 1 shows the welfare eﬀect of the two subsidies for diﬀerent subsidy
levels. The maximum steady state welfare is obtained for a subsidy level of
Si = 0.5 with i = K,X in the base line scenario with parameter values equal
to ρ = 0.055, θ = 2, α = 0.5, β = 0, ξ = 1, δ = 0.05, and L = 1.
[Figure 1 about here]
It is evident that a given welfare eﬀect is always achieved for lower financial
resources when the investment subsidy is applied.
The main result of analyzing the specific factors version of the model is
that the government should use an investment subsidy when it can choose
between a production subsidy and an investment subsidy to correct directly
for a monopoly distortion. In this version of the model, there is no diﬀerences
between economic eﬀects of the two subsidies, however, there is an important
diﬀerence since the investment subsidy is more cost eﬀective for all levels of
financial resources. The broader insight of the result is that a government
should identify the most cost eﬀective alternative of direct instruments when
government spending is restricted.
3.2.2 General Model
The result of the above section is the basis for the hypothesis that the in-
vestment subsidy, i.e. the indirect instrument, may lead to a higher welfare
eﬀect that the production subsidy, i.e. the direct subsidy, for certain cases of
the general model under restricted government spending. This hypothesis is
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based on a trade-oﬀ between two opposite eﬀects. On the one hand, the in-
direct instrument may be more cost eﬀective implying that the subsidy level
is possibly higher when the investment subsidy is used. This potentially
leads to a larger eﬀect on intermediate production. On the other hand, the
investment subsidy distorts the capital market in the sense that the invest-
ment price and thereby user costs of physical capital are lowered, leading to
higher demand for physical capital in both sectors of the economy. Con-
sequently, the subsidy does not improve upon the misallocation of primary
production factors across sectors. In the following, it is investigated if the
former positive welfare eﬀect from cost eﬀectiveness can outweigh the latter
negative welfare eﬀect from introducing new distortions by such a magni-
tude that the government should use the indirect instrument to correct for
monopoly prices under restricted government spending.
Government spending is assumed to equal 1% of initial value added, i.e.
value added in the initial steady state equilibrium without government inter-
vention.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 presents the adjustment of key economic variables over time. Panel
a confirms that the level of the investment subsidy exceeds that of the produc-
tion subsidy. This leads to a higher capital stock such that the investment
subsidy brings the capital stock closer to the socially optimal level, see Panel
b. On the other hand, the share of capital employed in the intermediate
sector is not aﬀected by the investment subsidy, whereas it is brought closer
to the optimal value under the production subsidy, see Panel c. The in-
vestment subsidy does not aﬀect the share of capital as a consequence of the
distortion in the market for physical capital. Under the production subsidy,
the government increases the relative incentive to produce in the interme-
diate sector, implying that larger shares of primary production factors are
allocated to this sector.
The remaining panels present the eﬀects of the two subsidies on con-
sumption, the value of the monopoly, and the rate of return. The important
question is whether the welfare eﬀect of the investment subsidy is larger than
that of the production subsidy. The time profiles of consumption hint to
the answer, see Panel d. It is evident that the consumption level decreases
on impact when a subsidy is implemented and increases over time to a new
and higher level. Under the investment subsidy, the incentive to invest is
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increased, leading to a higher share of output invested in physical capital.
This tends to lower consumption in the economy. Under the production
subsidy larger shares of primary production factors are employed in inter-
mediate production, which increases the demand for physical capital and
thereby increases the level of investments. This eﬀect depresses the level of
output available for consumption. On the other hand, the higher level of
production factors devoted to intermediate production and thereby higher
intermediate output leads to an opposite eﬀect on final goods output, which
thereby increases the level of output available for consumption. For the
parameter values used in the numerical simulation the net-eﬀect of these
changes implies a lower consumption level on impact. In the longer run,
higher capital stocks kick in and increase consumption levels.
On impact, consumption decreases by about 2 percent under the invest-
ment subsidy, whereas it decreases by 0.6 percent only under the production
subsidy. Over time consumption increases by as much as 6 percent under
the investment subsidy and about 3 percent under the production subsidy.
The issue of interest is whether the consumption profile of the investment
subsidy leads to higher welfare than the production subsidy. This turns out
to be the case; the change in equivalent variation of the investment subsidy
equals 1.32%, whereas the change equals 1.13% for the production subsidy,
see Appendix E for the derivation of the equivalent variation. Hence, the
indirect instrument leads to a welfare gain that is about one sixth larger than
that of the direct instrument.
Figure 3, Panel a, presents the change in equivalent variations of the
two subsidies for diﬀerent levels of government spending in the base line
scenario. It is seen that the indirect instrument generates a higher welfare
eﬀect for spending levels below 4 % of the initial output level, implying that
the government should use the indirect instrument. Above this spending
level, the government should use the direct instrument because it generates
a larger welfare eﬀect.
[Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 is consistent with three propositions developed in Bhagwati (1971).
The first proposition states that "optimal policy intervention, in the pres-
ence of distortions, involves a tax-cum-subsidy policy addressed directly to
oﬀsetting the source of the distortions..". The second proposition states
that "for each distortion .. it is possible to analyze the welfare ranking of
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all alternative policies, from the (first-best) optimal to the second-best ..".
Finally, the third proposition states that "reductions in the "degree" of an
only distortion are successively welfare increasing until the distortion is fully
eliminated". The present analysis complements these propositions with the
result that there may exist alternative instruments to the direct instrument
that leads to higher welfare increases for "high degrees" of an only distortion.
For the remaining panels, the sensitivity to changes in the parameter
values of the result in Panel a is investigated. Panels e and f present the
sensitivity from changes in ξ and β. These two parameters represent the
importance of physical capital as production factor in intermediate goods
production and in final goods production, respectively. The more impor-
tant physical capital is in intermediate production, i.e. the higher is ξ, the
higher is the cost eﬀectiveness of the investment subsidy and the higher is the
relative change in the equivalent variation. The reason is that an increase
in ξ implies that the investment subsidy has a larger eﬀect on intermediate
production. For the same reason, the equivalent variation related to the
production subsidy also increases. However, the positive eﬀect on the equiv-
alent variation for the investment subsidy exceeds that of the production
subsidy, leading to higher relative equivalent variation. On the contrary, the
more important physical capital is in final goods production, i.e. the higher
is β, the higher is the welfare loss from introducing additional distortions
under the investment subsidy and the lower is the relative equivalent varia-
tion. This implies that the production subsidy becomes more advantageous
to apply.
3.2.3 Combined Policies
A final issue is whether it is preferable for the government to use either the
investment subsidy or the production subsidy separately or whether poli-
cies combining the two subsidies should rather be used. Welfare eﬀects of
combined policies are presented in Figure 4.
[Figure 4 about here]
The value on the horizontal axis shows the share of government spending
used on the investment subsidy. The remaining share is used on the pro-
duction subsidy. The change in the equivalent variation of diﬀerent policies
is measured in relation to the change for the production subsidy only policy.
It is evident that the investment subsidy only is the optimal policy when
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government spending is 1 or 2 percent of initial output. When government
spending equals 3, 4 or 10 percent, a combined policy is preferred, whereas
the production subsidy only is the optimal policy when government spending
equals 15 percent of initial output.
It is found that the threshold level of government spending for a combined
policy to be preferred to a production subsidy only policy equals 13 percent
of initial output. This should be compared to the requirement for govern-
ment spending under the optimum policy, which equals 21 percent of initial
output in the base line scenario. Consequently, for levels of government
spending below 60 percent of the spending level required for the optimum
policy, investment and production subsidies should be used in combination.
The main insight from Figure 4 is that the importance of the investment
subsidy in designing economic policy is phased out continuously when the
level of government spending is increased. When this level increases, both
subsidies increase for unchanged expenditure shares used on the two sub-
sidies. This generates two eﬀects. First, the higher investment subsidy
results in a more severe eﬀect on welfare from the new distortion introduced
in the market for physical capital. Second, the higher production subsidy
indirectly increases the incentive to invest as discussed above in Section 2.5.
Both eﬀects tend to lower the investment subsidy, such that the new com-
bined policy consists of a lower expenditure share for the investment subsidy.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
Bhagwati (1971) generalizes the insight from Bhagwati and Ramaswami
(1963) and derives three important results in the case of an only market
distortion: The first proposition states that "optimal policy intervention,
in the presence of distortions, involves a tax-cum-subsidy policy addressed
directly to oﬀsetting the source of the distortions..". The second proposition
states that "for each distortion .. it is possible to analyze the welfare ranking
of all alternative policies, from the (first-best) optimal to the second-best ..".
Finally, the third proposition states that "reductions in the "degree" of an
only distortion are successively welfare increasing until the distortion is fully
eliminated".
The results of Bhagwati (1971) leave room for an important hypothesis:
In the situation with indirect dynamic distortions and restricted government
spending it may be the case that policy instruments targeted at the indirect
14
dynamic distortions lead to higher welfare eﬀects than the direct instrument.
This hypothesis is supported in the present paper and may be the case if the
indirect instrument is more cost eﬀective than the direct instrument. This
implies a positive relative welfare eﬀect that may be so large that it is not
outweighed by negative welfare eﬀects from introducing new distortions in
the economy. Hence, it may be the case that an instrument used to correct
for the indirect dynamic distortion leads to a higher welfare eﬀect for lower
levels of government spending, even though welfare increases continuously
with the direct instrument.
Sriniswasan (1996) discusses the results of Bhagwati (1971) and concludes
that the main insight is still valid. In the economic literature the original
framework has been extended to include analyses performed in dynamic set-
tings. In this relation, Bark (1987) analyzes welfare under autarky and
under free trade when distortions are present. The main result of the analy-
sis is that free trade may be inferior to autarky when distortions cannot be
removed. Moreover, an important line of research related to credibility and
time inconsistency of trade policy exists, see for example Rodrik (1989, 1992).
To my knowledge no study addresses the question investigated in the present
analysis.
There are two broader implications of the analysis presented in this paper.
First, the policy instruments that are appropriate to implement depend on
the government tax base. This may be also be relevant for other applications.
One such example is R&D policies motivated by knowledge spillovers. Most
developed countries have R&D expenditures as a share of GDP around 2-2.5
% with governments spending around one third to one half of total R&D
expenditures, implying that government spending is around 0.5-1 % of GDP,
see OECD (2004). Jones and Williams (1998) argue that such spillovers
are important and that the optimal level of R&D expenditures are at least
four times higher than the actual level for the U.S. economy suggesting that
more government spending should be targeted on the activity. Mohnen
(1996) argues that the social rate of return to R&D shows great dispersion
across industries and estimated spillovers can be negative. Hence, it is not
clear that R&D policies are targeted on the right activities. An informed
guess based on the main result of this paper, however, is that R&D subsidies
may be appropriate to use from a welfare perspective even when knowledge
spillovers are absent because they are targeted on investment incentives.
Another important implication is that a wide range of policy instruments
should be included when economic eﬀects of policy programs are analyzed
15
for restricted government spending. The result is especially important in
relation to economies on relatively low stages of development that receive
development aid from foreign donors. Such foreign transfers are relatively
low relative to GDP in receiving countries, see for example Burnside and Dol-
lar (2000). The present paper suggests that support could appropriately be
used directly to encourage investment incentives instead of using instruments
that do not aﬀect these incentives directly, including direct instruments that
has static eﬀects because of larger welfare eﬀects.
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A Solving the Production Side
The production side of the economy can be formulated in six equations in
reduced form. These are the expressions for the rate of return, the wage
rate, and inputs of primary production factors in the two sectors. The rate
of return and the wage rate equal:
r = α2
µ
α2 (1− ξ) + 1− α− β
α2ξ + β
K
L
¶−(1−αξ−β)
− δ (14)
w = α2
µ
α2 (1− ξ) + 1− α− β
α2ξ + β
K
L
¶αξ+β
, (15)
whereas inputs of primary production factors equal
KY =
β
α2ξ + β
K (16)
and
LY =
α2ξ + β
α2 (1− ξ) + 1− α− βL. (17)
KX and LX are determined by KX = K − KY and LX = L − LY . All
expressions depend on aggregate physical capital and exogenous parameters.
B Market Clearing Condition
The market clearing condition for final goods is derived from (10) using the
definition for financial capital:
F = K + pN
where pN is the value of the intermediate monopoly that equals the present
value of profit in the intermediate sector, i.e.
pN =
∞Z
t
exp
µ
−
Z τ
t
rvdv
¶
πτdτ.
This expression is used to derive
rpN = p˙N + π. (18)
(10) is rewritten to:
K˙ = rKK + π + wL− C − δK
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using (18) and rF = rKK+rpN−δK. Profit and labor income are rewritten
to:
π =
1− α
α
α2(1+α)K 0εL0(1−ε),
wL = α2α (K 0/L0)ε L,
using (8) and (15), whereas the return to capital is rewritten to
(rK − δ)K = α2α (K 0/L0)(1−ε)K − δK.
using (14). Substituting these expressions into the above equation for K˙
leads to (12) of the main text.
C The Solution to the Model
The solution to the model is given by equations (14), (15), (16), (17), (11),
(12), (18) and the transversality condition limt→∞ [a (t)F (t)] = 0, where a (t)
is the co-state variable associated with the stock of financial assets. After
implementation of the production subsidy, the equilibrium equals:
K˙ = a2αK 0
ε
L0
1−ε 1− (1− α)SX
(1− SX)α
− C −B − δK (19)
C˙ = (r − ρ)C/ρ
P˙N =
µ
rPN −
(1− α)
α
α2(1+α) (1− SX)−αK 0
ε
L0
1−ε
¶
where
r =
a2α (K 0/L0)−(1−ε)
(1− SX)α
− δ
and
K 0 = K/
¡
(1− SX)β + α2ξ
¢
L0 = L/
¡
(1− SX) (1− α− β) + α2 (1− ξ)
¢
ε = αξ + β
B indicates government spending, which is determined as a given value, i.e.
B = B. Under the production subsidy, government spending equals
B = SXucX =
SXα2(1+α)
(1− SX)α
K 0
ε
L0
1−ε
.
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Under the investment subsidy, an additional diﬀerential equation for SK
is introduced. The system equals
K˙ =
a2αK 0
ε
L0
1−ε
(1− SK)
− C +B
(1− SK)
− δK (20)
C˙ = (r − ρ)C/ρ
P˙N =
µ
rPN −
(1− α)
α
α2(1+α)K 0
ε
L0
1−ε
¶
•
(1− SK) = (1− SK) (r + δ)− α2α (L0/K 0)1−ε
where
r =
a2α (K 0/L0)−(1−ε)
(1− SK)
− δ
andK 0, L0 and ε are determined as above with SX = 0. Under the investment
subsidy, government spending equals
B = SK
³
K˙ + δK
´
.
C.1 Specific Factor Model
The specific factor model, i.e. ξ = 1 and β = 0, equals:
K˙ =
L1−αKα
(1− α)1−α
− C − δK
C˙ =
Ã
α2 (L/K)1−α
(1− α)1−α (1− Si)
− δ − ρ
!
C
θ
P˙ =
α2 (L/K)1−α
(1− α)1−α (1− Si)
µ
P − 1− α
α
(1− Si)K
¶
− δP
where i = (X,K). It is evident that the economic eﬀects are invariant to
the chosen policy instrument.
C.2 Steady-State Equilibrium
Using the two systems (19) and (20), the steady state values for C and K
are derived under the two policy instruments. The steady state values for
21
consumption equal
C∗K = (1− S∗K)
µ
δ + ρ
β + α2ξ
− δ
¶
K∗ −BK
C∗X =
µ
(δ + ρ) (1− S∗X (1− α))
(1− SX)β + α2ξ
− δ
¶
K∗X −BX
∗ denotes the steady state value of a variable. Steady state values of K are
presented below.
D Market Solution and Command Optimum
The shares of primary production factors, the rate of return in relation to
the wage rate and the steady state capital stock equal:
KMY /K
M
X = (1− SX)β/
¡
α2ξ
¢
LMY /L
M
X = (1− SX) (1− α− β) /
¡
α2 (1− ξ)
¢
rMK
wM
=
α2ξ + (1− SX)β
α2 (1− ξ) + (1− SX) (1− α− β)
L
K
KM
∗
=
µ
α2α
(δ + ρ) (1− SX)α (1− SK)
¶ 1
1−ε ¡
(1− SX)β + α2ξ
¢
L0
after implementation of the two subsidies. ∗ denotes the steady state value of
a variable. The laissez-faire solution of the model is derive for SX = SK = 0.
For comparison, the command optimum is presented. In the planned
economy, i.e. in the absence of the monopoly distortion, the equilibrium
equals:
KCY /K
C
X = β/ (αξ)
LCY /L
C
X = (1− α− β) / (α (1− ξ))
rCK + δ
wC
=
αξ + β
1− αξ − β
L
K
KC
∗
=
µ
αα
δ + ρ
¶ 1
1−ε β + αξ
1− αξ − βL
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E Dynamic Equivalent Variation
The intertemporal budget constraint:
∞Z
0
exp
⎛
⎝−
tZ
0
rvdv
⎞
⎠Ctdt = H0 + F0 −B00
is used with the Euler condition for consumption to express:
C0 =
1
Ω0
(H0 + F0 −B00)
where
H0 =
∞Z
0
wtLt exp
⎛
⎝−
tZ
0
rvdv
⎞
⎠ dt
F0 = PK0K0 + PN0
and
B00 = B0
∞Z
0
exp
⎛
⎝−
tZ
0
rvdv
⎞
⎠ dt.
H0 is the present value of labor income, F0 is non-human wealth at time 0,
and B00 is the present value of tax payments.
Ω0 =
∞Z
0
exp
⎛
⎝
tZ
0
(1− θ) rv − ρ
θ
dv
⎞
⎠ dt
By using the expression for C0 and the Euler condition for consumption, the
utility integral, the indirect intertemporal utility function can be formulated
as:
U =
µ
Ωθ0 (H0 + F0 −B00)
1−θ − 1
ρ
¶
/ (1− θ) .
The dynamic equivalent variation is defined as follows:µ¡
ΩM0
¢θ ¡
HM0 + F
M
0 +EV
¢1−θ − 1
ρ
¶
/ (1− θ)
=
µ¡
ΩS0
¢θ ¡
HS0 + F
S
0 −B0S0
¢1−θ − 1
ρ
¶
/ (1− θ) .
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The superscript S denotes the case when a subsidy is implemented. M de-
notes the initial situation described by laissez-faire steady-state equilibrium.
This yields the equivalent variation:
EV =
µ
ΩS0
ΩM0
¶θ/(1−θ) ¡
HS0 + F
S
0 −B0S0
¢
−
¡
HM0 + F
M
0
¢
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Figure 1: Welfare Effects under Different Levels of Government Spending, Specific Factors 
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Note: To determine the welfare effects taking the transitional dynamics into account under the two policy instruments, 
the model is simulated using the "Time-Elimination Method", see Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1991 and 1993).  
Furthermore, the dynamic equivalent variation, EV, is applied to measure welfare effects.  For a derivation of EV, see 
Appendix E.  The transitional dynamics under the two subsidies are based on the parameter values ρ=0.055, θ=2, α=0.5, 
β=0, ξ=1, δ=0.05 and L=1. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Transitional Dynamics, Base Line Scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: To determine the transitional dynamics under the two policy instruments, the model is simulated using the "Time-
Elimination Method", see Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1991 and 1993).  The transitional dynamics under the two 
subsidies are presented for the base line scenario with parameter values ρ=0.055, θ=2, α=0.5, β=0.1, ξ=0.8, δ=0.05 and 
L=1.  The baseline parameters are chosen in line with existing literature on economic growth, see for example Mulligan 
and Sala-i-Martin (1993) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Chapter 5). 
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Figure 3:  Welfare Effects under Different Levels of Government Spending, General Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: To determine the welfare effects taking the transitional dynamics into account under the two policy instruments, 
the model is simulated using the "Time-Elimination Method", see Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1991 and 1993).  
Furthermore, the dynamic equivalent variation, EV, is applied to measure welfare effects.  For a derivation of EV, see 
Appendix E.  In Panel a, parameter values equal ρ=0.055, θ=2, α=0.5, β=0.1, γ=0.8, δ=0.05 and L=1. In Panel b, ρ is 
increased to 0.08; in Panel c, θ is decreased to 1.001; in Panel d, α is increased to 0.6; in Panel e, β is increased to 0.15; 
in Panel f, ξ is decreased to 0.7; and, finally, in Panel g, δ is decreased to 0.025. 
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Panel c: Decrease in θ
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Figure 4:  Welfare Effects of Combined Policies under Different Levels of Government Spending, 
General Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: To determine the welfare effects taking the transitional dynamics into account under the two policy instruments, 
the model is simulated using the "Time-Elimination Method", see Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1991 and 1993).  
Furthermore, the dynamic equivalent variation, EV, is applied to measure welfare effects.  For a derivation of EV, see 
Appendix E.  Parameter values equal ρ=0.055, θ=2, α=0.5, β=0.1, γ=0.8, δ=0.05 and L=1. 
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Panel b: Government spending equals 2  percent of initial output
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Panel d: Government spending equals 4 percent of initial output
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Panel e: Government spending equals 10 percent of initial output
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Panel f: Government spending equals 15 percent of initial output
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Panel c: Government spending equals 3 percent of initial output
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